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Abstract. A wide range of security services may be available to applications in a heterogeneous 
computer network environment. Resource Management Systems (RMSs) responsible for assigning 
computing and network resources to tasks need to know the resource-utilization costs associated 
with the various network security services. In order to understand the range of security services 
an RMS needs to manage, a preliminary security service taxonomy is dejned. The taxonomy is 
used a s framework for a preliminary method for dejning the costs associated with network secu- 
rity services. 
1 Introduction 
Several efforts are underway to develop middleware resource management systems (RMSs) that 
will logically combine a wide range of network resources to construct a “virtual” computational 
system [2] [5] [ 101. Geographically distributed, heterogeneous resources are expected to be used 
to support applications with a wide range of computation needs. Large parallelized computations 
found in fields such as astrophysics [ 113, aerodynamics, meteorology, etc. will require allocation 
of perhaps hundreds of individual processes. Multimedia applications, such as voice and video 
will impose requirements for low jitter, minimal packet losses, and isochronal data rates. Adaptive 
applications will need to adjust to changing conditions. The RMS in such an environment is 
responsible for: efficiently scheduling multiple simultaneous tasks onto specific network 
resources; supporting user requirements for performance and security (viz, QoS); and providing 
support for tasks to adapt to changing resource availability. 
Users or applications submit tasks to the RMS, which schedules the tasks for execution. As part 
of the process of estimating efficient task schedules, the RMS must balance resource-usage costs 
against user benefits. Specifically, there might not exist sufficient resources to maximize the bene- 
fits to all users. Thus the RMS must quantify the costs associated with the entire range of network 
services. These include bandwidth, task execution speed, latency, jitter, etc. Costing of security 
services in this context has received little attention. The challenge is to associate costs with the 
entire range of network security services. 
The purpose of this paper is to present a preliminary taxonomy of security services, and to show 
how this taxonomy can be used as the foundation of a system for supplying security-costing infor- 
1. This research was supported, in part, by the DARPA/ITO Quorum Program. 
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mation to an RMS. Section 2 presents our preliminary taxonomy. Section 3 is a sketch for how the 
structure of the taxonomy might be used to define quality of security service requests to an RMS. 
Section 4 examines how the cost of using various elements of the taxonomy might be presented to 
an RMS; and Section 4 is a summary conclusion. 
2 Taxonomy of Security Services 
Users and applications on the network are presented with various security services (e.g., authen- 
ticity, confidentiality, integrity, non-repudiation, etc.). A security service may be used to imple- 
ment one or more security policies (organizational or automated [16]), which are in turn 
implemented by one or more security mechanisms. Some mechanisms provide fixed services, and 
some are variant.* Additionally, the RMS may make choices for the user regarding variant secu- 
rity mechanisms, as part of its schedule formulation or adaptive re-scheduling (see Section 4 ). 
Each security mechanism is associated with a service area, which indicates the general topograph- 
ical component of the network in which the security or protection is effective. The taxonomy 
identifies three service areas: end system (e.g., a client or server system), intermediate node (e.g., 
routers, switches), and network connection (i.e., the “wire” connecting various systems and 
nodes). Security mechanisms associated with end systems and intermediate nodes protect 
resources (e.g., data and programs) that are associated with a node or system; for network connec- 
tions, we are concerned with mechanisms for protecting information that is physically in transit. 
Table 1 provides our preliminary taxonomy. It lists security services, example mechanisms and 
associated service areas. The service areas are designated: “M” for Intermediate Node, “W’ for 
wire, and “ES” for End System. The Total Subnet (TS) service area identifies mechanisms that 
cannot be assigned exclusively to either of IN, W, or ES. 
2.1 Rationale for the Taxonomy 
In constructing a taxonomy one wishes it to be both useful and complete. Since a taxonomy is 
simply an organizational artifice, it must have reason to exist, which is its usefulness. Addition- 
ally, the taxonomy fails if it does not account for all of the elements of the classes that it attempts 
to organize. 
We have found this taxonomy to be a useful tool for characterizing the security services and 
requirements that a RMS might encounter in the network context. As such, it is useful for organiz- 
ing a quality of security service request (see Section 3 ) and for presenting costs to a Resource 
Management System (See Section 4 ). 
As for completeness, we assert preliminarily that the top level is complete. Our taxonomy 
includes the traditional security categories found in the literature, e.g., Pfleeger [ 121 (confidential- 
ity/integrity/availability), Ford [4] (authenticatiodaccess control/confidentiality/integrity/non- 
repudiation) Stallings [ 151 (confidentiality/integrity/availability/authenticatiodnonrepudiatiod 
access control) (Note that in the latter two examples we find “access control” to be redundant with 
availability, confidentiality and integrity). Empirically, all of the example mechanisms that we 
have examined so far have been accounted for in our top level list of security services. 
1. Variant mechanisms offer the user various “degrees,” or strengths, of security (viz., over and above some minimum 
requirement). See [9] for details. 
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SECURITY SERVICE EXAMPLE SECURITY MECHANISMS 
0s access controls, Cryptographic credentials Data Confidentiality 
IN 
W 
Traffic Flow Confidentiality 
Active network supports internode authentication based on digital 
signatures. 








digital notary and non-repudiation services 
Active network nodes reserve bandwidth for network administrative 
traffic. Priority-based scheduling for application traffic. 
bandwidth reservation protocol. 






Guarantee of Service, 
Availability 
~ 
auditing of network control functions 
rule-based and profile-based network intrusion detection, intrusion 
correlation engine to identify intrusions across a group of subnets 
firewall, proxy server, guard 
Audit 








40-bit DES, 128-bit Blowfish 
0s access controls, Cryptographic credentials 
Active network nodes monitor traffic and inject dummy packets in 
response to certain triggering conditions. 
~~ 
communications uses a Virtual Private Network with encapsulated 
packets 
~~ ~ 
Traffic padding up to a defined maximum is provided. Beyond that 




0s access controls, Cryptographic credentials 
cryptographic chaining, integrity sequence numbers, and digital sig- 
natures 
0s access controls, Cryptographic credentials 
0s identification and authentication mechanism; use of Digital Sig- 
nature Standard; use of trusted certificate authority 
IN I Active network nodes report transactions to secure logging facility. 
The second level (viz., end system, intermediate node, and network connection) is a simple 
enough partitioning of the generic network topology that we claim it to be complete through 
inspection. The list of mechanisms in Table 1 is not intended to be exhaustive, but provides a 
framework for illustrating the taxonomy. 
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3 Quality of Security Service Requests 
The security service taxonomy may be useful in understanding how security is involved in a Qual- 
ity of Service request. Security in the Quality of Service context has traditionally implied the gen- 
eral notions of one or more of the following: confidentiality, authenticity, access control, and 
integrity [3] [13]. However, there is no reason why a Quality of Security Service request could not 
include all of the elements from “Security Service” and “Service Area” in Table 1.’ In other 
words, we envision a security vector in a fully-functional Quality of Service request to include 
levels of service for the range of security services and mechanisms that we have identified. Thus, 
a generic QoS request would look something like the following in a BNF-style notation: 
QoS Request ::= task-specifier, security-vector, performance-vector, otherfactors 
And a security vector would appear as follows: 
security-vector: ::= security-component [, security-component]* 
security-component := security-service, service-area, level 
security-service ::= <services from Table 1> 
service-area ::= [ES I IN I W] 
level ::= <mechanism-dependent security-level indicaton 
A component may be included in the security vector for each variant security mechanism, i.e., for 
each mechanism in the network environment that provides to the user a choice of security “level.” 
For example, a partial security vector might look like this: 
data confidentiality, W, crypto-high (e.g., 128-bit keys), 
authenticity, W, medium (e.g., public-key signature), 
nonrepudiation, ES, high-assurance (e.g., Common Criteria rating EAL7 [ 13) 
Here, for the sake of exposition, the “level” of each security component is somewhat arbitrarily 
assigned. Establishment of nomenclature and metrics for these levels is the subject of ongoing 
investigations [7] [ 181. Translation mechanisms [6] may be utilized in presenting a high-level 
Quality of Security Service interface to the user, while managing parameters (such as a suitable 
translation of “level”) to the underlying detailed security mechanisms. 
4 Costing of Security Services 
To motivate the need for security costing information, a specific RMS scheduling mechanism is 
described. We will show how this work requires detailed security costing information. 
Resource management systems are responsible for efficiently scheduling multiple tasks onto com- 
puting and network resources in a distributed, heterogeneous computing environment. RMSs sup- 
port Quality of Service by scheduling to meet user requirements for performance and security, and 
by providing support for tasks to adapt to changing network resource availability. 
An RMS schedules tasks for execution in the network in response to requests from users or appli- 
1. Given that the over-arching network security policy demands some minimum levels of security service, selections 
for QoSS may be provided to users to any degree of security over and above those minimum levels. A system can 
always provide more security, at the user‘s discretion, than the minimum required by the base security policy, 
while still complying with that policy. Finally, in order to meet performance or other objectives, a user may indi- 
cate a maximum security service to be provided by the system. 
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cations. The task may be submitted with a QoS “specification,” which articulates the user’s 
desired quality of service, including security services. An RMS currently under investigation, the 
Management System for Heterogeneous Networks [5], has as its primary goal determination of 
the best scheduling support for many diverse applications, each with its own quality of service 
requirements, in a distributed, heterogeneous environment. MSHN preserves compatibility with 
existing security policies, applications and operating systems through its middle-ware role. This is 
in contrast to network operating systems, which strictly control the access to and utilization of 
resources, and usually require modifications to the OS, application, or security policy. 
The MSHN RMS constructs task schedules based on a network infrastructure model. This model 
includes the resource and security requirements of current and waiting tasks, and the security and 
availability of network, computing and storage resources. The resulting schedules are provided to 
task handlers that run the tasks and provide feedback to the scheduler. If the model is inaccurate 
(e.g., security or resource availability changes), the RMS adjusts its model and potentially 
reschedules the tasks (see Figure 1 on page 6). 
RMS schedule construction consists of several logical phases, or steps: 
1. In the reduction phase, the scheduler finds the realizable resource assignments for the task by 
discarding the possible assignments that will not work according to the model. In addition to 
resource availability matching (e.g., required service type vs. resource type), security plays a 
key role. Both the task and the resources are characterized by security requirements. Those of 
the task must be met by a subset of the resources. Those of the resources constrain the task. 
The task’s security characteristics are compared to the minimum security requirements of the 
various resources and infrastructure components to determine where the task can run. Addi- 
tionally, the task’s minimum and maximum security requirements (e.g., reflecting the user’s 
QoS security specification) are compared to the services available from the resources and infra- 
structure. The result is a set of resource-assignment “solutions,” where each solution identifies 
various resources sufficient to run the task. 
2. The resource usage costs, including costs for accessing security services, are derived for the 
various solutions. 
3. In the optimization phase, an “optimum” solution is heuristically selected. The criteria for 
selection is to (attempt to) minimize costs and to maximize the QoS benefit to the users ( [7] 
[9] [17]). Le., using realizable resources from the reduction phase, the scheduler attempts to 
create a schedule to meet QoS requirements for all of its tasks. In order to support as many 
tasks as possible, the scheduler must meet the typical task scheduling constraints while mini- 
mizing resource usage costs. 
After step 3, some RMSs may make various network resource reservations. Finally, the task is 
submitted for execution. 
If a particular security mechanism is “fixed” (i.e., always applied) then the overhead for the mech- 
anism is part of the normal cost of running the task and the normal costing mechanism used by the 
RMS will suffice. For variant security mechanisms, however, the security overhead will vary, 
depending on the user’s QoS request. Some task invocations will utilize little, if any, of the variant 
mechanism and other invocations may utilize the mechanism at an increased level. Also, the 
scheduler may adapt security support, while maintaining any minimum system security policy 
requirements, in order to schedule the tasks most efficiently. The RMS must calculate how much 
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task request 1 
1 
I I 
I Model 1 I Handler) 
4 I feedback I I 
FIGURE 1. Resource Scheduler. the task handler is responsible for realizing the scheduler’s 
execution plan and provides feedback to the scheduler so that it can dynamically adapt the 
schedule to evolving resource conditions. 
the use of the security mechanism will increase the cost of the task, according to the specific secu- 
rity “level” requested. For this reason, the RMS must have access to detailed information about 
the resource cost (as well as the task’s requested QoS) for each variant security mechanism. Near- 
optimal solution selection depends on the accurate estimation of per-task, per-resource, cost of 
security. 
The RMS’s costing information may be table-driven or algorithm-based. The cost measurement 
scale may vary for each mechanism and resource. A costing example follows. 
4.1 Costing Example 
The security overhead for several security mechanisms is shown in Table 2. 
The data confidentiality mechanism is a 40-bit DES encryption mechanism implemented in the 
link layer. For message non-repudiation, a commercial non-repudiation service mechanism is 
used. The cost of using this mechanism is a per-message exchange of n bytes with the remote non- 
repudiation server, and c clocks per message-byte to create the crypto-checksum for the message. 
The intrusion detection mechanism is shown to use a fixed overhead of the network bandwidth 
(e.g., for sampling and probing) along with constant processor and storage overhead. 
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Table 2: Security Cost Examples 




remote non-repudia- I E S  I tion service Message Non- Repudiation 
Data Confidentiality I Wire 
Intrusion Detection I TS I experimental ID sys- 
link layer 40-bit DES 
I I t e m  
Cost Measure 
Processor clocks per byte [ 141 
2n bytes per message network band- 
width, plus c clocks per byte 
n Mbytes per second of overall band- 
width, plus m instructions per second, 
plus b bytes per second storage 
Costing information is provided to the scheduler, which will use these data and its current system 
model to select services, including those for security, that maximize the benefit for the collection 
of tasks it is serving [8]. 
5 Discussion and Conclusion 
A security taxonomy has been presented for describing functional requirements of network secu- 
rity policies. It has been shown that this taxonomy can be used for different purposes, including a 
costing framework for network security mechanisms. Continued effort is required to determine 
the best units for the cost measures. For example, all measure could be unitless and normalized 
within a common framework. This approach would require a careful description of the semantics 
of the units with respect to each security service. Alternatively, units can b.e retained and the com- 
ponents combined into a “vector” to be used by the RMS scheduler. 
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